College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
George Wythe Lecture

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

1976

The Prospects of University Law Training
Francis A, Allen

Repository Citation
Allen, Francis A,, "The Prospects of University Law Training" (1976). George Wythe Lecture. 14.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wythe/14

Copyright c 1976 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wythe

The Pro :3 p c cts

of

Univ ersity Len! Tn.-tining

Francis A. Allen*
First Geo rge Wyth e Lecture, College of William and Mary,
Hilliar:lsburg, Virginia. Dec ember 3, 1976

It is altogether appropriate that at this place and "
in the

~'7aning

moments of the bicentennial year, thought

should be give n to the future prospects of American legal
.Williamsburg, Virginia and tlw College of ~Villiam

education.
and Nal-y ~

fr ()~n

vlhich so much that is b es t in our national

life has sprung, constitute also the c ra dle of university ..
based lRv7 training in the United Stat es .

l'Iore than any other

person, George \'Jythe, in \·;rhose honor th e.se lecture;.:; are named)
personifies the valu e s that h av e induced Ame rican universities
to undertake and maintain the systemat5_c study of law and the
training of

la.~·;ryers.

Like all of our traditional values, those

of George Wythe require mod e rn re-examina tion and restatement.
When this is don e , it will be found, I believe , that the
assumptions that underlay George Wythe 's career at this college,
r e tain a cont i nuing importanc e for

A llK~'~ ic an

legal education,

"-2-
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the universities, and the legal profession.Into the life of every law dean or former dean come
opportunities to discuss the future of legal

educa~ion.

There

have been times in the past ';'7hen I 'vonde red \'lhether these invitations might better be extended to memb e rs of almost any other
group associated with the legal profession -- young teachers,
law students, or practicing lawyers; whether, in short, the
jaded veterans of the educational establishment are not perhaps
those least likely to com.l: ll.1 nicat8 a vision of the future.

These

doubts persist; but after surveying some of the modern talk
about legal education (of \vhich there:: is a gre.8t deal), I have
concluded that a word or twa more from the legions of the superannuatcd will not necessarily lower the average quality of
contemporary discourse.
In addressing the assigned topic, it is an inconvenience
to confess, with the biblical Alnos, that I am neither a prophet
nor the son of a prophet.

American legal education has been

profoundly influenc e d in the past by the course of our history,
and on e must anticipate that it will continue to take its shape
under the influence of political and cultural forces generated in this
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soci e ty.

In es tinwtin g the na tur e a nd s t re ng th of those force s ,

however, we see thr ough a gl a ss darkly..

The perils of prophecy are

illustra ted by an observation of the late Brainerd Currie, a
dis tin gui s he d l e ga l. s cholar a nd, dur in g hi s

li fc t~e~

the leading commentator on American legal educatiDn.

p e rhaps
Professor

Currie v e ntured to predict that there l;vould be no fundamental
alterations in univ e rsity law training in the fifty years follo-

2/

wing 195 6 .-

Events, of c ou r se , may ult ima tely

have b ee n subs t 3ntially

co n~ec t;

but it

seC;:;:lr~

pr. OV2

him to

fa ir to s ay

that Profe ssor Currie did not an t icipa t e , and indee d c ould not
anticip a t e , th e f enr,en t a nd c1:i.ssC! t isLs.ctionJ that have come
to chara ct e ri.z e cont empo r ary di scuss i o n ~; of 1;:,\>7 school education.
The course I int e nd to foll ow is more c a utious or (i£ you prefer)
more craven tha n that pursued by some othe rs vlho have addressed
my topic.

Certain questions of great moment face American legal

education today.

I shall att empt to ide ntify a few Qf these

and to apprais e the ir implications.

My v e nture s into prophecy

will b e co nfin e d to the prop os i t ion th a t how the se issues are
r e solve d will de e ply in f lue nce th e cour se of univ er s ity law

, -4trainin g for the balance of this century and well into the
next.
It is not my purpose in these remarks to trace the
acad emic car ee r of Georg 8 Wythe or to

att e~ pt

discussion of his educational philosophy.

an

e~te nded

Indeed, I have b e en ·

strictly admonished not do so for the very persuasive reason
that there are others, particularly on this campus, who know
a great dea l more about that suhject than I do.

Those instruc-

tions Her.e souf,dly based and vlill not h e d:Lsrel.;aro.ed.

Yet in

this instanc e the past is so cleal."ly ii·lv olved \vith the pres e nt
and the future that it is hardly possible to escape all reference to Wythe and his contribution.

Today the traditions of

univer s ity 1mV' trainin g as,sociat ed with his name are the object
of widespread attack and denigration.

There is no issue of

greater moment for the future of American legal education than
the question whether university law training will preserve the
aspirations of quality and breadth that George Wythe brought
to the College of William and Mary almo st two hundred years ago.
There is nothing in evitable about university involvement

-5-

in legal education.

Thorsten Veblen, writing in the 1920's,

was able at tlt<1t late date to conclude · that "lmv schools belong
in the

mod~rn

dancing."

3/

university no more than a school of fencing or
Although university colleagues of law faculties

do not ordina r ily spe ak so pointedly to the subject, at least
when law professors are near, there are, no doubt, some who
would substantially endorse Veblen's sentiment even today.
Admitting a 1mV' school into full membership in the university
cormllunity

ha ~;,

or ought to ha ve ) ce1:t ai n significant cons e'-

quences.

Such a school obviously mus t b e c oncerne d ' -7 ith

nicating knowledge and skills useful in professiona l

C011IiTtU-

pra~tice;

but a unive:csity l2.H school's con,,'1litI:1e nt: cmlllot end there.

As .

an integral part of the university it assumes the university's
obligation to discover and conmrllnicate neH knowledge.

It m:ust

be deeply concerned "t\lith the values given expression in the law.
Its purpose is not simply to affirm but also to criticize; and
this critical obligation is at times directed to la"tyyers, the
law, and to the society of which they are a part.

The law

school . is both a crit ic of the laH and a source of nevl law.

In

··6-

American society it is a training ground for leadership
very broad segme nts of

~n

our political and cultural life.

University lmv training, initiated in the United States
bv George Wythe, ought therefore, almost as n matter of definition, to be in L''3 11ectua lly based uncI hUIna ni s1: ically motivi:\ted.
Yet it is precisely these aspirations that are today being
challenged or, 'w hat is almost equally serious,
ignored.

~eglected

or

Americ a n legal education is confronted by the rise of

a neH anti-int c ll e ctualisr:l, new ) no t in kind, but in its extent
and the intensity of its expression.

!+ I

Within the space of

hardly more tha n a decade, traditional legal education has bean
~

engulfed in a tide of critici sm , a criticism directed both to
the perforrna nc 8 of lmv schools and to t.h e principles upon
the schools have proceded.

~!hich

This is an arresting phenomenom-, and

something needs to be said about the origins of this new critique
and about its implications.
It is implicit in what has just been said that fidelity to

the idea of a university requires univers ity law training to ask
not only "how to do it," but why "le do it, and hm.; our social

-7purpos es can best be realized.

The record of achieveme nt of

American 1m.; schools in the twentieth century is an impressive
one, a demonstrable proposition but one frequently ignored in
~0dern

disc ussions of legal edu c a tion.

failures .:lnel ina.dequ a ci es ; every
catalog of these deficiencies.

Ye t the re have been

obse:cv'(:o }~

has h1.s own priv.:lte

The most serious of these,

however, are the failures of th~ schools to honor their own
professed aspirations of int e ll ect ual d e: pt h and htullanistic
involveme nt.

Cl osely related is the si;xi.lar defcmlt of the

univers ities th emselves .

There h as b 8en

that American univ ersities have not

Ci.

adh(:~ r<?d

grm'l ing conviction
to their high mission,

and thi s opinion is shared by large nurr:bers of persons of
widely vari ed political beliefs.

This sense of unease ante-

dates the second Horld \'Jar, and was communicated at least a
generat ion earlier \"hen the modern multiversities were in the

5/
early stages of their careers.-

James Thurber, in a moment

of exasperation, could capture the alma mater of his student
days in the phrase, "Millions for manure ; not one cent for
lit erature !"

-8-

It may we ll be true , howev e r, tha t World War II constituted the mos t dev as t a tin g ex pe rienc e for Ame ric nn hi gher
education.

In tho se years the conception of the university

prima rily as a re s ou rc e to enha nc e ou r milit a ry and industria l
might c apt ure d the: imagina ti on o f Ii1 nny , hat h on and off the
campuses.

The university thus gain ed pre s tige, not as a place

where thought is cultivated and honored, but as an indispensable
utilit a ri a n tooL

Although many hav e b ee n disillusione d in the

int e rven i l"lg

by the di scover)'

yea r ~}

t hCl~: '1.m iV 2 1~ s

i.ti es do no t

pos sess the s ove re i sn r emedy f or a ll t he pra ct ica l difficulties
associa ted Hith the huma n condit i on, th is h i ghly instnunental
of the univ e r si ty r ema ins deep l y cnL:ell c hcd .

Vi.Cvl

I t may be

s a id, of cour s e, t ha t a democra tic so c ie ty is entitled to
detennine what it s universities shall b e ; and if the democratic
consensus requires the university to concentrate its resources
on the performance of practical service s, to teach courses in
macrame and motel ma nagement, who can gainsay it?

No doubt, the

reality is that universities cannot and ought not to separate
themse lv es ri g idly fr om the pr a ctical needs of the surrounding

-

- -- -

.... _

. . . . - . . _,.. ... \0'0'

~ - ,.....

. ........... ,.-

: . .. o;' ~ ' .-, •

•• ~ ~ ~ O:l' ~ • ..,
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society.

There arc costs that must be paid, however , for these

practical involvements.

One is that thes e numerous departures

from intellectual and humanistic concerns compromise the ability
of unive rsities and university law schools to resist the demands
_on '"ry
r10 \\1 b""
'-- J..

TIl"
L ,!

d'"

0:;

t'll.. Co.
r ,.L.

1c,2,al
_

ecluc.:~tion

be concentrated on

m8.::tE'-.c"
S
-

of what my colleage, Paul Carrington, has described as "instantaneous

.

pract~ca

lOt
~ y. "'

Havin g said our

~ea ~ul..E.~~,

hOWeVel", one c a n hardly escape

the conclus ion that a significant p9.rt of the mOd El'[) discon te nt
with American lega l education has littl e to do wi t h actual
failures of educational performance by the la\¥' schools or the
universitie s .

We are living through an ex'a in \.7hi.ch most of our

social and political institutions

~re

viewed with skepticism

and doubt, and in vJhich the ins titutions, themselves, revea1 a
significant lack of confidence in their own operations.

We are,

in short, passing through what Robert Nesbit has described as

6/
a twilight age.

The danger is that in the present mood of

depress ion we may commit ourselves irrevocably _to . courses that
reject or compromise our hi.ghest aspiratio ns and values.

I

, -10-

There arc other social influences abroad that challenge

7/
Holmes' dictum that "Law is a profession of thinkers".-

"The

life of the mind", to use another Holmesian phrase, has been
the obj ect of c onscious attack botL on and off the campuses.
Because reason has b ee n recruited to serve many pernicious and
dubious ends, some have concluded that reason itself, rather than
the values that have determined its uses, is the source of our
difficulties.

Because mod e rn behavioral science confirms

Cardin a l NevlITlan' s dictum that reason is too fragile an instrument
to contain the passion and pride 0; man,

~/

many have reached

conclu sio ns th at NC"\vTIlan v70u.ld have scorned: narwly, that reason
is therefore

un~ Dportant

and that we may retain our hopes for

liberty and ord er without its cultivation.
These broad social tendencies, many of them aggressively
anti-intellectual in nature, are brought home forcibly to the
law schools in these times.

Many of our best students, being

childre n of the age, reveal a profound skepticism for the rational
process, itself.

Rational explication of judicial decisions,

for example, is sometimes seen as a camouflage or cosmetic, a
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cosme tic tha t dis guis es the brut e f a ct of powe r or the operation
of mo t iva tio ns lying dee p in the uncons c i ous of which the de cisionmakers ar e usually unmvare.

The ins e curities of the time pus h

our stude nts, and s ome ti mes th e i r t ea che rs, iota a que st for
cert a i nt y .

Bu t t he demand f or certi t ude i n a ,vor ld a nd a disc i-

pline in which much is inevit ably continge nt and inde terminate
attacks the int egrity of thought; for the demands are at war \vith
reality, and t o ma int a in the que s t r equi res the clos ing of
minds.

The hed onism of the age , COE1.i1lUnicat ed in [t lmo s t every

t e levision c ommerc i a l and in much moden1 ech.lca tion a l philo s ophy ,
impair s the ability of s ome of ou r stud ent s to und ergo the rigo r s
a nd di sc i p lin e of the li f e of t he Qind .

Yet that ability u nde rlies

all in t ellect ua l a nd muc h profes si ona l ac hievement.
The present discont e nts with legal education are not simply
the product of influences engendered in the broader society.
Some have their or igins in the la\v schools, themselves, and in
the legal profession.

A system of university-based law training

inevit ably introduces t e nsion into the relations between the
practicin g bar an d th e schools.

Thi s has b ee n app a r e nt from the

-12time that universities first assumed primary respon sibi.lity
for the -training of lawyers in the Unit ed States.

The source

of this tension resides principally in the fact that the mission
"
..
.::r:o.1 ob]"
· .lgatJ.on
s or, .unJver
s }.°t-y l en-; schoo l~:, \'lhile encompassing

much of ilnme di,:..te inte rest to the practicing profess ion, include
a great deal more.

For the past one hund r ed years this tension

has been largely a cre a tive, rather than a destructive, one, and
has re s ulted in a n allocation of function s among t he schools,
the profess io n , and the CCltl'r ts ~. Jhich h as serve d the mutual
a dvant a ge orr: a 11 partlcs.
0

There i s evid e nc e that the toler[;.nr:e and mutual fore bearan ce on vlhi. c11 the Amer ic a n sys tsm of l ega l educat ion i s
found e d and on which it s prior

a chiev~ ne nts

being subj ected to serious strain.

are based, are

The evidence to \-7hich refer-

ence is made is not the advocacy, in and out of the law schools,
in favor of some greater concentration on practical lawyer
skills in the professional curriculum.

Dialogue concerning the

methods and emphasis of law training has always existed, and is
indisp e nsable to the continuing D.dClptation of lega l education to
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the world jn which it finds itself.

In rec e nt years, however ,

attitudes of impatience and ho s tility toward the law schools
have b ee n expressed in some
S ocne

1 ai·;'Y<';l.'S

and J U C12;2S

l:'dv e

se~nents

moved

of the practicing bar.

b .~ yo n d

dialogu2

B.nd p2rS"--'-2. ~

sion, and seek to determi.ne ur directly influence the priorities
of laH school curricula through the device of rules of court
stipulating specific course requirements for bar admission.
These effort s hav e not be e n de terre d by the &lmost comp lete
absence of reliabl e kno;vledr.;c about the r e l at ion s of pa rticular
courses of inst ruction to professional c o:n petenc€.
even more

alarn~in g h Cl s

Perhaps

been the. not2 of acerbic criticism

sounded in discuss ions of law school efforts th8.t s 2ek objectiv e s
beyond the narrowes t of professional conc e rns.
Criticisms of this sort are not new.

On the contrary, they

have accompanied the career of university-based law training
in the United States from the beginning.
expressions of this sort have gained in
. support among some lavJYers and judges.

Yet is clear that
volQ~e

and perhaps in

One need not be an uncri-

tical d e fender of all that the law schools have done or failed to

-14do, in ord er to perceive that these attitudes refl ec t far more
than actual educational failures by the schools.

One central

fact is that the bar and the courts, th emselves, have felt
the sting of pub1 ie di sClFprov a.l.
rea cti on to assume

t:1 ~L t

It

lS

a typ ica 11y A:ner ican

soci e t:ll f3.ihlr CS

m1lst:

be r e 13 t ed to

educational failur es , and hence the scrutiny of the l aw schools
to discover the sources of the profes s ion's difficulties.

The

youth r evo lution of the 19GO 's created gaps of style anCi substance
betv-Te e n the youn g er and old er pract ::.tioners , and ma ny of the
latter hold the universitites and the c nvers i ty law s choo ls
respon s ible for the stranse attitudes a nd demearwr of th2 young.
Practicing la-vry err.; have sor:J.e t imes been understand ubly res e ntful
of th e at titud es of a f E:\v 1a\\1 pI:o fcc:;sors t o\\Tard the l, .lr ) and
have concluded that professors have little sympathy for or
understanding of the problems of professional practice.

A few

lawyers deplore the lead e rship of the schools in certain reforms
that affect the income s of lawyers, such innovations as "no fault"
legislation in ' the fields of tort law and
the r ecasting o f probate procedures .

domesti~

relations and

Ot hers a re un sympathet ic

-15-

with the efforts of law schools to enlarge the opportunitie s
of young members of racial and ethnic minorities to secure legal
education, tllrough special admissions programs.
Hm-Jever the n8'\''; t: ide of cr it ic ism is to be
principal th.cus t is no t in doubt.

e)~pl a ined,

its

NL1c.:h of it expresses ho s t~lity

to legal education intellectually based and humanistically
motivated.

It tends toward a narrmving of educational purpose

.
an d a 1 O\'l(:.~rlng

C

O.L

•
t- 'J.o ns .
asplra

Perhaps the most striking ma ni-

fest a tions of this tend e ncy t hat I h ave cnountered in recent
months -';vas pro\7idcd, not by a practicing l ai;vyer or a judge,
but by a faculty member of an accredited layl school.

Ninety

percent of law students, he as se rted, wish to become practicing
lawy e rs; they are not interes te d in becoming legal philosophers.
Yet one can hardly imagine an educational default more complete
than the graduating of young persons from the law schools to
take their places at the bar who do not have something of the
philosopher about them -- young people unconcerned about the
philosophical category known as justice or the ethical category
concern ed with right and wrong action.

If it is desir~ble to

-16have a ba r de e ply conc e rn e d with the ba s ic values of this
society and ad e pt in giving th em practic al ex pres sion, how is
this goal to be approache d exc ept through a regime n of professi ona l train i ng that seeks to identify those values a nd to
analy ze the ir impl ic a t ion s , a nd to do s o con s i s t e ntly with
the highest intellectual standa rds?
Levi once said of l e ga l education:

The n Provos t Edward H.
"A dialogu e of values --

in ad d it i on to our humaoi st ic a ppre ciation of our artistic
creations of log ic, is in fa ct within our t ra d i ti on.

It is

one of the th i ngs 'which makes u s uniql1cly v alu3.b I e to the

9/
univer s ity c ommu nity ."-

It is one of t he thi ngs, it may be

adde d, tha t makes t he l aw schoo l s valuab l e to t he pr ofe s s i on
and to s oci e ty.
One of the myths of the r e cent past is that basic ethical
concerns can be ma intain ed and enlarged without appropriate
attention being give n to the arts of re as on.

The Watergate

affair gave rise to demands for increas e d attention to legal
ethic s and pro fess ional respon s ibility in the
Indee d) it

vla S

l~w - schools.

f reque nt ly a sser t e d or i mplie d tha t the neglect

-17of these matters in the sc hools significantly contributed to the
brcakdm-:n of public moralit}' in the United St.1tes.

The ne'1;o7 attcn-

tion curren tly being given to profcssiol1o.1 responsibility in
and out of the schoo ls seelLlS entirely justified.

Explicit at ten-

tion to the etb.ic s of 1m} p I-Clc tic e lan gui s hed i n th8 1m;" schooJ. s .)
not in most instan ces b ecause the subject was thought to be unimportant, but because of the

pedagogical difficulties

in prov id ing cour ses that pose the r elev an t
and rC 21istic

l/7::':y

a nd t!,OS0 thc::t

,.,ho have not c1.:Lroctly
sentati o~ .

an~·.

issu~s

encounter~d

in a serious

" ,::::.:.!:t:i.ng f u l to students

e} ~ p2ricnc 2 d thr:!

di lelllIni::'::; of client repre-

Teach ing ma teri a ls now ava il Rb le go f a r to obviate

thos e c1i.ffi cu lt i E:;,:; ; and the

inc l:easi~1g

jl\.lI!,be r of !:;t.udcnts \.:Iho

encount e r clientfi ilJ their aC8.c1emic progr<1n1s adds point ar:rl
relevancy to instructi on in professional responsibility.

One

may anticipate greater attention to these matters in the future
than has been given in the past.
The discus sio ns of Watergat e and law school obligations
to provide instructio n in professiona l responsibility, however,
have r ev ea l e d assumptions ab out the role of values in legal

-18-

education th at are both mistaken and

thr~3te nin g.

One of these

appears to be that the only point in the 1m.; schoo l experience
in which ethical concerns are revealed is that at \.]hich the
canons of profes sional reE:ponsihility arc
subject of disc uss ion.

H~a. c1e

the expl icit

This ignol'i.:: s the 'Idia logue of valu2s"

that goes foreward in law school classro oms everyday to which
Mr. Levi referred and identified as one of the principal contributions of legal education to the univers ity commun5_ty.

Moreover ,

it ignores the fact that th e Ill ife of; the mind l l p0 3s esses an
ethic, that one inducted into the proc esses of r eas on and
analysis by a skillful and conscientious teacher , experienceD
not only intell ec tua l, but also ethica l training.

This is

true b ecause the life of the mind invol ves a discipline and a
set of restraints which must be given priority over personal
interests and inclinations.
must be sought and resp e cted.

Evidence to support propositions
Once collected, however, it must

be ruthlessly tested for adequacy.

Social thought must always

acknowledge the necessity of action on th e bas is of imperfect
knowl e dge; but the

~nper fections

of knowledge must be conceded

-192nd

conclusions mns!: be accepted

as

tentative and subject to

modification when new knowledge appears.

The besetting intel-

lectual si.n is the narrowing and closing of minds, even when
appareut security and repose may be gained by doing so.

OnB

who has had the good fortune to study at the feet of great
teachers \l7hose careers have been given over to the life of the
mind, '-l ill not doubt that he has undergone a profound ethical
experienc e , and this is tru e \·jhatevc:::- the suhj 8 .cl: of the di.scourses may have been.
An even more remarkable note has been introduced in
recent public discussions of the rol e of values in legal education.
The sugges tion has been adv anced that the demands of rigorous
analysis are in

SO-,TI2.

sense antithetical to ethical values.

If,

in fact, morality and intellect stand in opposition to each
other, if the hold on our values is so tenuous that it cannot
withstand the force of rational analysis, our plight is serious,
indeed.

One should be cautious in accepting such propositions.

This is not to deny that intellectual arrogance - constitutes a
threat to morals and sound reason.

Such arrogance violates the

-20-

ethic demand e d by the life of the

mind~

Thought about a

c,omrnunity's basic values urgently requires the decent h'Lill1ility
that results from a\vareness of ",hat we do not know.
sense demands recognition

th ~ t

the

rou ~ jne

Cornman

functioning of

socie ty must pr.-oceed on the a Sf:> Lt J.pLLon ·;::1ta t , fO J: the time.
being, there are some questions of policy and values that have
been decided.

But the reexamination of our own first principles

is pecul ia r ly nec.e.s 3 d ry in the s e time s, aDd, in truth, con
be prevented only thr ough the exe rci se of poli t ical or socia l
coercions of a kind incon s ist e nt with the g e niu s of a free
society.

Surely it is prefera ble, j.nso far a s po s sible, that

this reexamin a tion proceed f1: o:11 th e in t.e ll e ct r at her than the
viscera.
What has been said in the foregoing is that the most
urgent challenge facing university law training today arises
from attitudes that weaken the role of intellect and values
in legal education.

It has been asserted, further, that the

degree to which these attitudes are succe ssfully resisted will
go far to d c termine th e quality and cha r a c t e r of la,;v training

in the years ahead.

There are, however, othe r problems that

-£.1..-

are critical to the future prospects of legnl educa tion, and
brief attention will now be given to a few of th e se.
One of the paradoxical facts about contemporary discussions
sn~ll

of legal education is the
impact of ne,'l knmvl edge on

~1,.v

surely th'2seAwill

ou~~

attention being given to the
··ca'L l)('ca:'
lives .. ~ P r'r O"Je)···
.U
'_
L... ,''''
_ <::1.

•

,)...:.~

},)..l. ..

in the future, as in the past, provide

the dynamics of cultural change and hence of changes in the law
and its administration.

Much of what was most characteristic

of ninet eenth cen tury l aw was the product of the new knowl edge
and technology that &rose in that era.

To giv e only two striking

eXa!11ples , the 1a\v of torts and of C01·l, .):i.:':J.tions represent,
directly or indi rectly , accomodations to the discovery of what
we re then new sourCES of energy and to the perils produce d by
new modes of transp ort and by the gadgerry that accompanies an
age of technology.

It can hardly be doubt e d that in the present

era the new genetics and computer and electronics technology
are producing and Hill continue to produce comparable alterations
in the Horld He occupy and in the laH that Hill evolve.

Yet,

typically) discussions of reform in 1mV' training appear to
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be. di rC'cte d t o Cl l mos t ev e r y t opic e xcep t thi s s a li e nt r e ality.
The discov e ry o f new knowl e dge crea t e s t wo principal kind s
of probl ems for public policy and he nc e for the lat-v.

There are,

to mee t huma n needs and t o e.."lse the huma n con d it ion.

In a sub-

stantial sense mod e rn corpora te ent e rprise was created by the
steam engine and the dynamo, but it al s o may be s ee n as the product
of le ga l

inn ov a.tio~ls

introc1uc e c1. i nto Lho o l d f o rms of bus i ne ss

organiz2.tio n th ol t made possib l e the

acctrmu l a tion ~;

of c a p i u (l

nec e s s a ry fo r the soc i a l utili za ti on o f t he new knowled ge.
Second a r e. the pro1 .. 1ems of prev e nting t.he:
b e ing u s ed in
values .

~'7ay s

r.. (" ;>l l'~ n oH l e cl ge

f ro,u

tha t i mpa ir basic h 'l. Tffio. n i nt eres t s and politic a l

The un l ea s ing of new sour ces of energy c a n thre aten

the environme nt and th e very bas e s of physical e x istence .

The

age of el e ctronics ma kes po ss ibl e who l esa le violations of individual

privacy by gov e rnm e nt a.nd busine ss .

DNA r e search and

discoveries in the new biology pres e nt occasion s for new and
unpr e ce de nt e d fo rms o f public regul at i on .
The new

kn ow l edg~

h owev e r , affec t s mo r e tha n the b roa d

-23i ssue s o f pub l i c policy.

In a ddi tion, its impact is f e lt

in the routine practic e of law and in th e conduct of legal
educ a t ion.

The accucnul a tion of new kn m,.' l cd ge l1 as done mor e

omnicompetent l egal pra ctition er , capabl e on short notice
of mastering any new are a of le g al concern and of providing
- r s s 10na
•
1 a SSlsrDnc
"
. wh a ~Lcver f'1e l as
'
soun d couns e 1 a n d' pr u£2
o 1n

h e ma y b e c a l l e d upon to E,:el.-ve .

Th e p r LcU,c al re<:;,lity of

t e c h no l ogy a nd o f the soc. i a,l fo r n's tha t
£l.CC OlDo oatc

it .

Tlu_~ f ,l (; v(;",Y; cnt

t cr ;:. r cl

t'l !:1,ve

f urL,hC'J ~

d eve l ope d to
speci s, li.~.: at i o n

and t he r egul a t ion of professioDRl s pe c i a l i ti e s is a lre ady
evolving and will sure ly continue to do ,s o in the ye a rs
ahead.
But the c o ntinuing knowl e d ge expl osion has significanc e
for l ega l educ at i on going much b ey onu ' the eme rgin g sp e cialization of law practice.

It rai ses fundam e ntal que stions about the

orga ni za ti on of in s t ruct i onal

Cl l'1d

researc h programs jn the 1m"

- 2L~'-

schoo l s.

On e of these qu es tion s f::oes to the qualifications

of law teachers.

How can we in sure that the law faculties

will po s sess the kinds of trainin g sufficient to identify the
signifi.cance a nd socia l inlp o.c Ls of

Il(c: \) l~ n C:i'lledge

and rev c. a. J

a suf :Cic i en t ,\rLjeiom to cont 1: ibu ~c to the in sti tut ion a l acc omofations made necessary by them?

Very littl e in our traditional

hiring practic es has taken these capacitie s specif ically into
account.

This is not to say that 1m" f ncult ie G have been

uncon ceJ:ne d abou.'!.": th es(; new
legal scholarshi.p.

dim'~: r:.s :Lon s

of L :nv te a chine and

Ind eed , many l D.'>7 t ec:c ile rs since \V'orld War I I

have engaged in ex traordinary efforts of sel f - e duca t i on in ar ea s
outsid e the t raditional boundarj.es of the ir disc ip line, a nd
have done so b ecause of a sob e r r e aliz a ti. on tha t suc.h knoHleclg e
and capacities are required if the law is to serve its high
social purpose s in this era.

This effort at self-education by

law faculties, which surely must be regarded a remarkable
achieveme nt, has gone largely unnoticed in other departments of
American univers ities.

Yet i mpressiv e as this undertaking has

be e n, on e will lik e ly conclude that mo re syst ema tic and mor e
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exten sive efforts at enlarging the scope and understanding of
university law training will b e required .

What is needed today

is intelligent planning for these developments and for their
i
aceqU(l'::2
1

f' 1..Hl d':Lr1[,.

given these

m~:.tters

U-l1an
\? too
1.1
t I) i1
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by the 1m.] schools and th e philanthropic

foundations.
Closely related, of course, is the problem of research
policy in the l aH schools .

Hov? in the future will. the schools

contribute to performance of the university's obligation of
disc-ov e -d .ng and

c(J,~u:nunicC!t

L-,.g n'2 \<1 kno\>:rl c dge ?

that doc tri na l r e search , as in the

p ~~ t,

impo r t an t activity of the law scheols.
th is

c00trlbution be und erest imated .

One ma y anticipate

will c onst itut e an
Nor shoul d the value of

Tho rationalization of

COITmlon-law doctrine and the elaboration of constitutional theory
in the law schools during the present c e ntury have had significant impact on Aluerican society .

The development and refining

of legal doctrine becomes of greater, rather than less, importance
as social chan ges a ccelerate in the closing years of the century.
The futur e s t atus of empirical r es e arch designed to identify

-2Gsocial need s , t o evaluate publ ic policy an d the assumptions
on which it r es t s , is consid e rably mor e problematical, however.

One c an hardly avoid a s e n se of di sa ppointme nt in the

amount Rnd achieveme nts of "fa ct " l'ese <l.rc h produced i n the
1m,] [;c L.ools c.iS on e C8nvr:;;sc::; the record of i.m er ie ;::" l ega l

educ at ion in the twentieth century.

This se nse of unrealized

expectations persists despite cha nges in the law review literadi spl~y

tUre whic h cl ea rly
and

a11

inc reas :i- i.'!8

S

a deep e ning and widen ing of interests

oph:i s t ication in

ut:i..li;~ in3 t~h'2

ins ights

and t echn iques prod uc e d in o th er depar t ments of the univ e rsity.
Significan t independent. res 2arch effo 'r ts, d2s p it e some cons picuou s ,,'\c hiev em e nts , hClve not floul'ised

a~~

viel l i.n t he. 1m'7 s c h oo ls

as might have seemed likel y a generation a go , and very littl e
in the recent past gives promi se of

irr~in ent

changes in this

situa tion.
The basic c a use is tha t the law school s have not succeeded
in domes ticating the research function a nd integrating it into
their institutional prog r ams on a footing comparable to tha t
accord 6d the t eac hing functi on .

One may with justice complain
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abolJt

t1~ c

absy[1l.:ll deficiencies in the f 1.l wJing of 1m" school

research; but in truth neither the law schools nor individual
profes s ors have generally insisted on more adequate funding
in accents fon nd to be
alloc~tion s .

C O~11 r)c ll.i_ns

1:\y those

\ ·;110

control rcs8.:1rch

Large-scale research still appea rs to be an alien

and exotic intrusion into the operations of most law schools.
Many highly ca pable 1m" t eachers experience bad conscience if
the y are unable to jus tify the ir res s 2rch efforts as making
immediate and di Y.'C": ct

c on t)~ibut :Lons

to

tb(~ir

c las s ro cm tc a ching.

Yet, cl ear ly, the socia l i r..lportance of res e arch
factors other than its
tion.

iUl1nec1j<11: e

rilay

depcGd on

utility for la,,'; school inst ruc-

Desp it e gaJ_ns in the c ommand of r esearc h me thod ol ogy by

many law t eache r s , most sign ificant re search e fforts r equire
the services of technicians trained in other: disciplines.
Cooperative research efforts are certainly not to be scorned,
but it may be doubted that the contributions of socia-legal
research will be fully realized until many more lawyer members
of law school faculties than a t pre sent are equipped to perform
serious r esearch functions.
are of high import a nce.

Moreovc r ~

the pot en tial contribution s

Our b es t hop es for a jurisprudence

-28s e ns itive to socia l need s and

asp i rati ~ nG

G il d

c~pable

of

realizing social purp oses de pen d in l arge part on the securing
of knowledge that
c?t i on in El Dny

He

vii~ .?l

do not

nO'iv

posse ss .

Our present situ-

"l.ret=:lS of l ega l poLl cy J.S tb r,t: \-:;e lit £: 1:a1.1y

do not know what we are doin g , and we ar e not sufficiently
committed to finding out.

To rectify this failure is surely one

of the pre ss ing demands of th e futur e .

comp ar.s tiv c ly lit t l e c. tt e ntio n
of most modern

con~ e ntaries

11 ~ S

b ec-' ll given to the subj e ct

on Ame ric an

leg~l e~ucat ion:

the cont emporary conc er ns for i.ncre asing the c ompeten cy of
practicing l<1.\·;rycrs.

The'lack of emphasis given to the se

matters do es not reflect a judgme nt of the ir unimportance.
On the contrary, it seems clea r that the felt nee ds for greater
practical training b e ing expressed tod ay by many lawyers, judges,
and law stud e nts cannot sensibly b e ignored by the law schools.
What t e nd s to be overlooked in these di scu ss ion s , however, is
the d ramatic inc reases in direct contacts of l aw s tud e nt s with

\

.
-29pra ct ic e pLob lcms, inc luc.1in g th ose re la t ir,g to lit igation)
that have occurred in recent years ..
Nor should it be asumed that concern with practical
. . J.C:::.SI.0
r -. ,. ,,",
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educat ion inte llectually based ancl humanistically motivated .
Attention to practice problems can contribute interest and
realism to the study of l aw and thus co ntribute Lo the realiI

zat i o!:! of 1I12 lil G ltit"'-1 (~:t J 10 'lS obj cc t 'Lve s of legal education,
including the .enhancei':lcnt of prof ess ional

compet<~ ncy.

The

increas ed emphasis on practical skills becomes a threat '
to

un:Lv (;~:c~;:i. t y

trc-d.,-:i ns only

:I t

th e po:Lnt c::;: 'o hiet! it ignores

the broad range of v a lue s and social int e rests tha t legal

(i<.<ft..l,lrL-D..
education is called upon to perform.

Such insistence tends

toward a narrowing of vision and a lowering of aspirations.
In recent years proposals have been advanced by certain
lawyers, judges, and la'\V teachers that c a ll for a law school
curriculum involving t\vO years of academic study and a third
year devoted wholly to clin ica l and pra ctica l experiences.

-30The proposals assume that two ye a rs of classroom training
is sufficient to achieve its obj ec tives or, at any rate, is
all that mod e rn students will tblerate.

The third year

is

int ended to supply v arletl2S of pr3c tjc a l cXp e rl 2 tlCe for a ll
students, some of which experiences are no doubt lacking in
traditional programs of law tra ining.
These pr oposa ls surely de s erve th e close s t Clttention
more serious c ons id e rat ion than

C E ll

be 7ive n here . . One
~~

h6 ~es
~

that the bench and b a r in weighi ng this or o ther thoroughgoing education£1 1 r e forms will deman d a c a reful ex pe rime nta l
scrutiny of th,::; proposal b erorl:'; mov ing to mC:::1Cl3.to ry i mplE:IiK:n··
tation.

EducFttiona l nostrums , like ch8mi ca l me dications,

require careful preliminary testing before they can be safely
prescribed.

Is it self-eviden t that placing a student in

appren tice status for one third of his training represents the
optimum use of time for all persons entering the 'profess ion?
What allocation of costs and functions b e tween the. profession
and th e school s is to be mad e ?

If, as seems like ly, these

,

,

. -31pr ograms will r esu l t in in c reas e d c osts o f law training , what
are the implicati ons for increased costs of legal services to
the public and the accessibility of l ega l education for those
of Ibci t e d

m~ans?

to

be adv a nced by these proposals can be adequately defined and
identified, will the educational program provide lasting or
only temporary advan tages for the students?

Will

a

young

Imvy er: th):ee or f ive yem_
"s in p r act :Lc c~ C: c.: T:,)rlstratc significantly

greate -r command over professiona l skills t.hat).

th o~,~e

of similar

experie nce in practice but more coventiona lly tra in ed ? .A
lilt1 :Lt ed progr2ffi of ex per5_.ffi€ntDti on

un cl l3Y.'i::t.b 2 n by

a Iei ,'7 schools

on a voluntary ba s is might provide answe rs to some of these
questions.

Certainly they cannot be answe red responsibly today.

It would be infinitely more wasteful to defer these and
many other questions certain to arise, to the period

following

a precipitous mandatory imposition of the scheme on all of
American legal education.
Moreover, should it occur that the

t~vo-year

curriculum

followed by a year of apprenticeship in the courts or law

·

\

-32offices constitutes an appropriate device to achieve some
professional objectives, does it follow that schools with

important so'c ia1 ends should be prevente.c1 or seriously discouraged from doing so?

Some have overlooked the fact that

a significant diversity is developing in the typ e s and object J"_v c'"- of. l. E:{;t ', c:.l

part th e se

C. duca;: i 0t1

t ~ nd cn ci e s

in

tlL~.S
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p :r:uh l cr;;~;
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repre s e nt a he a l t hy plu r al ism and

reflect the en ormo'llS r dLl ge a nd v a d .e ti es of
a.nd of the

I)l
. .-

1 -s.~,;r p!~"2ctice

c n.cou n tey. r:".1 i n our ~~Jd-) li c li :fc~.

legit i ma te cJ lven:; i ty o f ob j

C!C t i Vl: s

A

j_n A18Cr ic ;?,n le gal education

is toda y bett e r c. a lculated to s e rve socia l int e r e sts than is
a Procrust e an be d.
To speak for traditional educational values involves some
discomfort at a time when innovation in all asp e cts of modern
life is seen a s a primary socia l concern.

The discomfort sterns,

howev e r, Lloto nly fr om those who a s sume tha t any de fense of
tradition a l v a lu es is sus pe. ct, but also frrnn those who ge ne rally

-33acc ep t the int el lectual anJ humanistic values sought to be
def ended in these remarks.
group is their silence .

What is remarkable about the latter

It is characteristic of intellectuals,

almost any stigma other than to be thought naive.

To such

persons the repetition of truisms is uncongenial and embarassing; and to reaffirm the importance of the intellectual and
and

hu mD. ~l. istic

dimensions <if

be indulging in tl-uisms .
but the
is

consequ~nc c

OCC 1..'. p:i.8cJ b ~'

l (~g~ll

ecluc aU. on i s thought to

There are pe l-haps othe r exp] anat ions,

of their silence i s not in dc ubt:

thos .:. ,,, , l.th very

(1i[ £e n~ pt: ·~·;·a:r:e 5

The tiDe has come to break th i s silence.
be

cautious in our claims.

to

the field

~;e ll.

We need to

Knowledge about the effects of

a given course or a particular educational experience on
subsequen t professional performance is in acutely short supply.
But about the spirit and motivations of an entire course of
training we may perhaps speak with greater confidence.

A

century ago John Stua rt Mill warn e d tha t "[t]he only security
against narrown ess is a liberal mental
HOH

c o:,:pletely

He.

cultivation.

10/
,.-

('m'br':-lce th a t. inE;ight lTIay dcLI..~ rnd.l1e th e

prospec t ~.. of tll1ivcrs
' it uJ l aw trainin g in the United States.
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and it rea ched fODgard in time -- a new principle had been
advanced: the training of the lawyer should be broad; it
should in c lude university training; 3.n d positive profession.:l l

training .

The Blackstoni&n elem2 nt of this principle empha-

si ZE:d ethics, as
l..::n·; a 11 c1 equity

~s

a

basis of
app li ed

nat"l1~:'8, 1

i~

1mv - -

co~ ~ ts;

0,

cO:!iponcnt of

lh~

Jeffers onian

'element emphasiz e d poli tic al the ory , the in atrunen t of the
legisl a to r and acimi,ni strat or.

Toge the r, thes e ideas accounted

for a phas e of legal education in America ''''hich

~",as

distin-

guished by bread th, intellectua l vitality, and productiveness,
and which has important significance for the modern university
laVl school."
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